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Patent Donations and Tax Policy 
Xuan-Thao Nguyen and jeffrey A. Maine* 
The charitable tax deduction h istorically served as a vital tool for the transfer of 
tech nology, encouraging corporations to donate patents to research universities 
an d other nonprofit donees. In a prime example, Boeing donated to Vander­
bilt University a patent that covers a particle-separa tion technology, an advanced 
version ofContinuous Flow Electrophoresis, with potential applications in nan­
otechnology. Boeing also advanced a group of patents to the University of Penn­
sylvania that could help treat bone diseases and injuries. In another example, 
DuPont donated its patents relating to zeolite catalysts for further chemical and 
materials research to Michigan State University. The company also gave the 
University ofCalifornia at San Diego a group of paten ts relating to the adh esive 
technology called Tacky Dot® that has applications ranging from flat-panel dis­
plays to pollution ab atement. The Kellogg Company donated its patents relating 
to functional foods and consumer packaging. And Eastman Chemical Company 
provided patents to the University of South Carolina that would use the tech­
n ology as the cornerstone for its new NanoCenter. Unfortunately, the practice 
of patent donations like these is in jeopardy. Because of recent tax legislation 
targeting patent donations, the subject of this chapter, the charitable deduction 
system may no longer serve as a vital technology transfer tool. 
Federal patent law and fede ral tax law should work together to benefit society 
as a wh ole by facilitating the progress of science. U.S. pa tent law provides patent 
holders monopolistic rights vis-a-vis the significant legal protections for patents 
for a limi ted time. 1 Federal tax law allows most taxpayers to immediately recover 
the costs of their inventions, despite the fac t that these properties have long 
p rotectible lives un der patent law.2 While both patent an d tax laws promote 
' Copyright© 2006 Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine. This chapter was adapted from Xuan­
Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1721 
(2006). 
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socially desirable inventive activities, additional tax incentives are needed to 
encourage the dissemination of technologies to the public for the maximum 
social good. To achieve the policy goals of ultimate innovation, the government 
should provide incentives to encourage the patentees to donate, rather than 
abandon, their "orphan" patents to universities, hospitals, and other nonprofit 
organizations with research and development facilities that can properly exploit 
the patents. 
We advocate for the implementation of incentives that would encourage 
donors to surrender their monopolistic ownership of patents for the benefit of 
charitable organizations and, in tum, the development and growth ofsociety. We 
begin by exploring the trend ofcharitable giving and the impact oftechnology on 
postmodem philanthropy. The next section discusses the importance ofpaten~ 
in the global, knowledge-based economy and demonstrates the benefit ofoutright 
ownership of patents by charitable donees. Although th is section recognizes that 
the present tax system requires patent donors to make complete assignments to 
charities to obtain tax benefits, it demon strates that the present sys.tem does no~ 
adequately encourage donors to make outright gifts to charity. 
The chapter then critiques recently enacted legislation that targets patent 
charitable donations. It argues that the current regime fails to incentivize socially. 
desirable donations by eliminating any immediate financial incentives for patent 
charitable donations. This section identifies several problems with th e regime!s 
fo~us on postcontribution economic incentives, which negatively favors incom~ 
generating patents over other forms and favors commercially driven donees over . 
educational donees and other donees committed to basic science research. Th¢ 
chapter concludes by proposing a system based on immediate economic ince.o-. 
tives. To achieve optimal social giving, we propose an elective deduction regiin.e. 
whereby patent donors may choose to real ize immediate tax benefits upon contii"' 
bution or to enjoy deductions in postcontribution years to the extent the charitabl~ 
donee generates income from the patent property. 
THE ART OF GIVING 
Giving takes many forms. People give their time and talent to volunteer at 
community centers, hospitals, churches, and schools. Some devote years oftheir 
lives to missionary works; to volunteer in such organizations as the Peace Corps, 
AmeriCorp, and Habitat for Humanity; and to serve in the mili tary on missions 
that vary from peacekeeping to humanitarian aid. Others decide to donate their 
prized collections of art and artifacts to their institutions of choice. 
All charitable donations, ranging from the small daily acts ofgiving to orga­
nized philanthropic efforts, benefit society.3 Accordingly, charitable giving has 
been central to the United States and its national character for cenl;uries.4 In the 
earliest days of European settlement, John Winthrop told the Puritans sailing to 
the Massachusetts Bay Colony that, to succeed in the new land, they needed 
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to be a model of Christian charity.5 In the early nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies, the philanthropy of notables such as Peabody, Rockefeller, Carnegie, and 
Ford left a strong imprint on society. George Peabody, rega rded as the founder 
of modern philanthropy, was a remarkable New England in ternational banker 
who became America's first great educational philanthropist.6 The Rockefeller 
Foundation's gifts affected medical research, education, and public health in 
Europe, the Soviet Union, and China from World War I through the cold war? 
The industrialist Andrew Carnegie established the Carnegie Corporation ofNew 
York in 191 1 to promote "the advancement diffusion of knowledge and u nder­
standi ng," fundi ng p rojects in the areas of education , internation al peace and 
security, international development, and the strengthening of U.S. democracy.8 
Henry and Edsel Ford created the Ford Foundation with gifts and bequests to be 
a resource for innovative people and institutions worldwide.9 
Furthermore, in the last twenty years, changes in technology have tremen­
dously impacted virtually every aspect of the economy, society, and charitable 
giving.10 T echnological changes have facilitated the growth of private wealth 
held by individuals and corporate entities. 11 Indeed, in the late 1990s, the Inter­
net boom and robust economy were the key factors for the accumulation of per­
sonal wealth .12 Along with the new wealth came concerns about philanthropy. 13 
Potential donors searched for optimum ways to give their accumulated wealth , 
and a new breed ofdono.rs was born. Multimillionaires and billionaires from the 
technology industry approached philanthropy with venture capitalist principles, 
seeking a maximum return ofsocial impact from thei r giving. 14 The Melin da and 
Bill Gates F oundation,15 for example, has surpassed the ph ilanthropic notables of 
yesteryear, spearheading postrnodern philanthropy by directing the Gates's newly 
accumulated wealth toward charitable giving.16 In addition, technology-savvy 
individuals have turned to the Internet and developed e-ph ilanthropy as a new 
approach to maximize social good. 17 
The wealth accumulate.d during this recent technological revolution has 
spawned an increase in the number of charitable organizations. IS In 200 l , chari­
table foundations reached record asset holdings,l 9 and, today, countless websites 
offer advice to prospective donors, matching them with potential donees, projects, 
and causes .20 A recent study showed that 49 percent ofAmericans volunteer their 
time for civic activities, and nearly 75 p ercent of Americans m;tke fina ncial 
contributions to charities.21 These donations to foundations, institutions, an d 
organizations promote social welfare in various areas of philanthropy.22 
Dependent on charitable generosity, potential charitable donees search for 
and court potential donors. As the role ofgovernment in public fun ding contin­
ues to dimin ish,23 nonprofit organ izations compete for private support to fu lfill 
and expand their charitable m issions.24 Private donation s are pivotal to offset the 
sh rinking public funding of arts, science, social science, communications, ed­
ucation, health, research, religion, and democracy.25 T h us, an incentives-based 
system that facilitates giving is essential, not only to the donors and donees, but 
also to the development and growth of society. 
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PATENTSAND THE BENEFIT OF CHARITABLE OWNERSHIP 
Intellectual property, such as patents, has become increasingly important in 
most sectors of the economy and society.26 The rapid growth of technology and 
information has enhanced companies' patent ownership portfolios, as compan~e~ 
seek to protect their rights in their inventions.27 Moreover, as the economy haS: · 
become increasingly global and knowledge-based, the role ofintellectual property· 
has become vitally important.28 For example, the World Trade Organizatio(.(~ 
encompassing approximately 150 nations,29 imposes upon all nation-member~ . 
systematic protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights within th~ ·. 
global free trade movements.30 Such a system indicates the role ofpatents, among · 
other intellectual property rights, in shaping the present and future direction of 
the global, knowledge-based economy.31 
To compete globally, the United States embraces a legal system of siTong 
intellectual property rights.32 Under U.S. intellectual property law, patents confer 
ownership for twenty years from the date of filing the patent application.33 The 
patent ownership encompasses the right to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention.34 The owner of a 
patent is free to transfer all or part of the patent to others, and a transfer of patcn.L 
ownership is recorded with the U.S. Patent Office.35 
Modern theorists regard the firm as the repository ofresidual property rights, 
such as intangible intellectual property assets.36 The firm may assign these resid­
ual rights, such as patents, if it decides upon internal evaluation that they ilrc 
no longer needed for the firm's functions in the market. In such cases, the firm 
grants ownership in the intellectual property assets to an assignee-donee.37 Donat­
ing residual patents to charitable organ izations, such as educational and resea rch 
institutions, enables the firm to control its competitors' access to those intellectual 
property rights. 
Moreover, as the new owner of a patent, the assignee enjoys all the right~ 
conferred under patent law.38 For example, if the charity is a un iversity, its 
researchers, graduate students, and undergraduate students enjoy the right r·o 
use the patent in their scientific investigation and study.39 If the patent covers 
a particular method, the university can conduct experiments using the method 
without obtaining a license from the assignor.40 
Rather than assigning or donating the patent to a charitable organizatio1 
altogether, the firm may alternatively execute a license to use the patent to a 
charitable organization. A license is generally nothing more than a promise by 
the licensor not to sue the licensee,41 as long as the licensee follows all tl•c 
conditions set forth under the license agreement.42 If the licensee, however, uses 
the patent beyond the scope of the licel)se grant, the licensee is in breach of the 
license and infringes the patent.43 Thus, to a charitable organization, having a 
license, rather than owning a patent ouiTight, means having a restricted right to 
use the patent with all the limitations described in the license agreement.44 
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These limitations may include the ability to use the patent only for cer­
tain defined purposes,45 within identified laboratories belonging to particular 
investigators, or for certain periods of time.46 Limits on the patent's purpose and 
temporal and geographical limitations,47 among others,48 may hinder investiga­
tion and studies based on the subject patent if certain uses constitute a breach 
of the license agreement and infringement on the patent.49 Furthermore, costs 
associated with patent litigation are exorbitant and may serve to reinforce the 
licensee's fear of using the patent beyond the limitations. 5° 
A license may generate other uncertainties and administrative burdens as 
well. Who at the charity will negotiate the license agreement? Will that person 
possess an understanding of all the limitations indicated in the license agreement? 
Will that person be able to communicate the limitations to those who desire to 
use the patent license in their investigation and study? Who will monitor the use 
of the patent to insure compliance with the limitations? Most charitable organi­
zations do not have technology transfer offices to handle patent incoming license 
concerns,51 and even those organizations fortunate enough to have technology 
transfer offices generally under staff such offices. 52 
Most charitable organizations are unwilling or ill-equipped to deal with the 
limitations and u ncertainties associated with the unattractive process ofobtaining 
a license to use a patent. 53 Thus, many prefer to obtain the outright ownership of 
the patent. 54 As an assignee, as opposed to a licensee, a charity has unrestricted 
use of a patent, eliminating any uncertainties. Consequently, the charity can 
limit costs incidental to obtaining a patent license or arising from the use of the 
patent u nder the license agreement. 
The outright assignment ofa patent means the charitable assignee possesses 
its own portfolio of paten ts. The charity can use the donated patents to further 
its own investigation and study that may lead to the creation of future inventions 
and thus ownership of new patents. Moreover, the charity can then rely on its 
own enhanced portfolio to attract new talents, funding, and investment.55 
Charitable donees clearly prefer to become assignees, rather than licensees 
ofpatents, through outright gifts from donors. The question arises, then, whether 
there is a system currently available to encourage the firm that would like to 
completely assign its patents to a particular charity. 56 The current charitable 
tax deduction scheme requires a donor to give its entire in terest (or undivided 
interest) in donated property to a qualified charity. More specifically, no income 
tax deduction is allowed for contributions ofpartial interests in property, defined 
as an "interest in property which consists ofless than the taxpayer's entire interest 
in such property." 57 
W ith respect to donated patents, for example, a donor may not take a chari­
table deduction if he or she retains any substantial righ t in the donated patent. In 
order to qualify for an income tax charitable deduction under section 170 ofthe 
Internal Revenue Code (Code), the taxpayer must transfer "all substantial rights" 
in a patent, defined as "all rights which are of value at the time the rights to the 
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patent are transferred."58 In addition, a patent subject to a conditional reversion :~s 
not deductible unless the likelihood of the triggering eventoccurring is so remote 
as to be negligible.59 Assume, for example, that a do11or's contribution ofa pat~Qt 
to a university is contingent upon a certain professor remaining as a member Qf 
the university's faculty for the rest ofthe patent's life, which is fifteen years. Und~~· 
these facts, the donor would not be entitled to a charitable deduction becaUs:~ 
on the date ofthe contribution the possibility that the professor will no longer Qe 
a member of the university's faculty for fifteen years is considered "not so remo.t¢ 
as to be negligible."6° 
Although the tax system requires patent donors to make complete assignments 
to charities to obtain any ded uction , the question arises whether the system 
adequately encourages donors to make outright gifts to charity. Since owning 
patents is equal to having a monopoly in those patents for a specific duration of 
time, wh at are the driving factors persuading the firm, as the repository of residual 
property rights, to surrender its monopoly?61 
Under the U.S. Constitution, th e owner of the patent and society have a 
bargain: the owner enjoys the monopoly during a certain time period,62 and 
society enjoys the patent once it becomes part of the public domain63 at the 
conclusion of the time limit.64 Why should the firm, as the repository of residual 
property righ ts, give up its bargain prematurely, unless there are incenti ves to 
faeilitate and encourage the ending of the monopoly and the transferring of the 
ownership into the hands of charitable institutions~5 The firm could very wel l 
enjoy the fruit of its ownership by ~elling the patent monopoly for its current 
fair market value. By donating the patent asset, the firm forfeits the potential 
i ncome generated by and from the asset.66 Unless financial incentives exist tha t 
reflect the value of the patent in the knowledge-based economy and thus serve 
as a significant motivating force for donating, the firm will continue to keep the 
monopoly u ntil the time limit expires. Charitable organizations will only be able 
to obtain the benefits ofthe patenttl1rough the onerous process ofseeking licenses. 
As a consequence, the charity and its charitable missions will be hindered, since 
a license m ust be negotiated, permissions must be obtained, and limitations 
dictated by the licensor must be obeyed . 
OISINCENTIVIZING PATENT DONATIONS 
Since 1917, the government has provided a financial incentive for taxp;1yers 
to transfer money and property to charities by giving taxpayers an imme.<li:al~ 
tax deduction for t{ieir donations.67 Although this economic incentive has Q-e,erl. 
costly from a federal revenue standpoint,68 promoting socially efficient donai{on§ 
represents sound policy. By encouraging p rivate philanthropy, the charit.t.bJ.~ 
deduc.tion minimizes the need for direct government subsidies to those orga!li~~{ 
tions, and prevents th e government from allocating subsidies as it sees fit.69 .1.:he 
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chari table deduction creates a more diverse, interesting society by a11owing tax­
payers, many ofwhom are politically powerless, to choose and support particular 
organizations they deem important. thereby advancing their own interests.1° By 
encouraging private donations, the charitable deduction provision helps foster a 
more ethical, moral society.71 
As originally enacted in 1954, the charitable deduction provision contained 
few limitations. To qualify for a charitable deduction, one had to make a money or 
property contribution to a qualified charity.72 A "contribution" was interpreted as 
a "voluntary transfer ofmoney or property made with no expectation ofprocuring 
a fi na ncial benefit commensura te with the amount ofthe tran sfer."73 Services ren­
dered to a charity were not considered property and, thus, did not qualify.74 The 
Code provided several categories of qualified orga nizations, including "certain 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, education" organizations.15 If a property 
contribution was made to a qualified charitable donee, the amount of the contri­
bution had to be determined. The charitabl e deduction provision, as originaHy 
enacted, provided tha t the amount of a taxpayer's chafitable contribution was 
generally the fair market value of the property contributed.16 
By gra nting an immediate deductio n equal to the fair market value ofdonated 
property, the charitable deduction provided an important econo mic incentive for 
patentees to donate their patents to further c haritable organizations' activities. As 
origin ally enacted, the charitable ded uction regime served as a vital tool for the 
transfer of technology. Large corporations with research and development facil­
ities often develop patents that later become inconsistent with their m issions or 
core technologies, that are inappropriate for licensing to third parties, or that 
have no value (for defensive purposes) in competitive markets. n Thus, the char­
itable deduction provision in its original form encouraged research corporations 
to dona te these "orphan patents" to universities with major scientific resea rch 
programs in which the technologies could be properly exploited .78 Research 
universities and other nonprofit donees were given the opportun ity to develop 
poten tial new technologies, wh ile b usinesses avoided high patent maintenance 
costs and received a charitable tax deduction equal to the fair market value of the 
donated patents. 
Dow C hemical, in a prime example of such a technology transfer, report­
edly donated 10,000 paten ts to qualified charitable organizations over a five­
year period .79 As patents became increasingly valuable and important to the 
knowledge-based economy, the practice of donating patents flourished. Rather 
than con tin uing to encourage such donations, however, the government has 
scrutinized patent donations and imposed sta tutory requirements limiting patent 
donation deductions. 
Most recently, Congress enacted tax legislation in 2004 that substantially 
altered the charitable deduction scheme for patents.80 In particular, the America n 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (2004 Act) eliminates the fair market value standard 
and reduces the amo unt a donor can deduct. The new legislation applies to most 
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forms of intellectual property, including patents, certain copyrights, trademarks, 
trade names, trade secrets and know-how, certain software, and similar intellectual 
property or applications or registrations of such property.81 
Forpatent contributions made on or after June 3, 2004, the 2004Act limits the 
charitable deduction amountto the lesser of the taxpayer's tax basis in the donated 
patent or the fair market value of the patent at the time of the contribution.82 In 
most cases, wherein patents appreciate in value, the lesser amount is the donor's. 
tax basis. Often, the donor's tax basis in a patent is very small; in many cases, the. 
donor's basis is zero because research and development costs are often deducteq 
when incurred.83 As a result, the 2004 Act reduced or, in many cases, eliminate<;!. 
an immediate tax deduction for gifts of patents. 
Although the 2004 Act reduces or eliminates the initial charitable deductioi.l;· 
it permits a donor to take additional charitable deductions in later years base~ 
on a certain percentage of the donee's income attributable to the patent.84 Mor.e 
specifically, a donor is allowed additional deductions for a limited number ·of 
years based on a specified percentage of the qualified donee income receive.d 
or accrued by the charity from the donated patent itself, rather than incom~ 
stemming from the activity in which the donated patent is used.85 "Qualified 
donee income" is defined specifically as "any net income received by or accrue-4 : 
to the donee wh ich is properly allocable to the qualified intellectual property.;'·8~ 
For purposes of these future deductions, "qualified intellectual froperty" doe$. 
not include intellectual property donated to a private foundation. 7 
The amount of the additional deduction a taxpayer may take each year :I$ 
determined using a sliding-scale percentage ofqualified donee income receiv~d 
or accrued by the charity that is allocable to the property.88 The percentag.~ 
~ecreases each year, for a period of twelve years.89 In the first and secon d ye~t~ 
after the contribution, a taxpayer can deduct 100 percent of the qualified dort~e 
income.90 In year three, a taxpayer can deduct 90 percent of the qualified done,e 
income.91 Moreover in year ten, the taxpayer can deduct only 20 percent of.the 
qualified donee income.92 
In order to qualify for an additional deduction in a future year, the aggregate 
of the amounts calculated using the sliding-scale must exceed the amount of the 
initial deduction claimed in the year of the contribution.93 Additional cha ritable 
deductions are not allowed with respect to any revenues or income received or 
accrued by the donee after the expiration of the legal life of the patent.94 Addi­
tional charitable deductions are also not available when patents are contributed 
to a private foundation (other than a private operating foundation or certain other 
Code section 170(b)(1 )(E) private foundations).95 
The 2004 Act was intended to curb improper charitable tax deductions re­
sulting from overvaluations of donated patents and other forms of intellectual 
property.96 Before enactment of the 2004 Act, the amount of a charitable deduc­
tion in connection with the donatiof! of inteHectual property was equal to the 
fair market value of the intellectual property at the time of the contributicm, sub­
iect to certain exceptions.97 The government defined "fair market value" as "tJ1e 
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price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge ofrelevant facts."98 The government, however, never fully 
articulated or formalized a standard or approach for determining the fair market 
value ofdonated intellectual property. As a consequence, valuation conflicts be­
tween donors and the government increasingly occurred as intellectual property 
grew in value and the practice of intellectual property donations also grew. 
As valuation abuses became more common, the government began to scru­
tinize intellectual property donations and impose statutory requirements lim­
iting intellectual property donation deductions. In its first major attack on in­
tellectual property donations, Congress took significant measures to curtail the 
availability of immediate tax benefits for contributions of copyrights by creators. 
Internal Revenue Code section l70(e), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
reduced the amount of the charitable deduction from fair market value to the 
creator's basis in the copyright (out-of-pocket expenses that had not previously 
been deducted).99 In many cases, copyright creators have a zero basis in their 
copyrights, as "qualified creative expenses" are immediately deductible and do 
not have to be capitalized. 100 As a result, the 1969 amendment precluded copy­
right donors &om enjoying an y immediate financial benefit from their charitable 
donations. 
The 1969 amendment, in contrast, had little impact on patent donations. A 
patent donor who transferred all substantial rights in the patent would generally 
get a deduction equal to the full fair market value of the patent. 101 By retain­
ing a fair market value deduction for patent donations, but not for copyright 
donations, patent donations continued to flourish in the aftermath of the 1969 
amendment.102 In the late 1990s, patents became increasingly valuable assets and 
important to the knowledge-ba'sed economy.103 The fair market value standard 
appealed to the new breed ofdonors who approached philanthropy with venture 
capitalist principles, .seeking maximum financial return from their giving. 104 
The fair market value standard, however, also spawned valuation abuses by 
patent donors.l05 In 2003, the Internal Revenue SeiVice (IRS) announced its in ­
tent to scrutinize questionable deductions of intellectual property contributions 
and to enforce requirements and limitations on paten t donation deductions. 106 
The plan, released in Notice 2004-7, included a multipronged attack on donors, 
promoters, and appraisers. Notice 2004-7 stated that "some taxpayers that transfer 
patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations are claiming 
charitable deductions in excess of the amounts to which they are entitled" and 
warned that "the SeiVice intends to disallow improper charitable deductions 
claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transfer of patents or other intellec­
tual property to charitable organ izations."107 
Although the no.tice announced the government's enforcement campaign 
against and planned attack on donors, promoters, and appraisers, it provided 
little guidance on the proper method of computing a patent's fair market value. 
According to the notice, "the fair market value of a patent must be determined 
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after taking into account" factors including"( l) whether the patented technology 
has been made obsolete by other technology; (2) any restrictions on the done·<{~: 
use of, or ability to transfer, the patented technology; and (3) the length of tix:n,e, 
remaining before the patent's expiration."108 
Unfortunately, the IRS's enforcement campaign regard ing patent donations; 
announced in 2003, n ever got off the ground. It was rendered moot when, l~ 
than a year later in the 2004 Act, Congress hastily eliminated the fair mark~t 
value standard for contributions of most forms of intellectual property, including 
patents.l09 By eliminating the fair market value standard, the 2004 Act reduG'~~ 
the number ·of negligent and intentional overvaluations of patent donations a.nd,~ 
correspondingly, reduces the administrative costs and burdens associa ted Wifu 
overvaluations of donated patents. In addition, the 2004 Act is expected to gex;t,., 
erate hundreds ()f millions of dollars in additional federal revenue each year}l9 
However, the greater policy issue, one that has been overlooked by Congress, k 
whether it adequately incentivizes socially desirable patent donations to further 
charitable goals. 
Advantages of System Based on Immediate Economic Incentive 
A fair market value measuring rod for charitable deductions allows doni;>ts·tq 
en joy an immediate tax benefit equal to the fair market val ue ofdonated irtt~l1e~" 
tual property, even though such donors are not required to report in their incQ't,il¢ 
the difference between the fair market value of the donated intellectual property 
and the original out-of-pocket costs or unrecovered basis in them. 111 By elimi­
nating any immediate financial benefits for intellectual property contributions, 
the 2004 Act will have a drama tic impact on in-kind donations of inteilectual 
property not targeted by the 1969 Act.ll2 
Indeed, it has been predicted that the ch aritable deduction system w.ill no 
longer serve as a vital technology transfer tool. Potential patent donors, for iil­
stance, will undoubtedly opt to abandon their inventions under the n.ew law, 
rather th an contribute them to charities as was common under the old law. As 
one commentator predicted, "80-90% of the brainpower ofthe U.S. will be left·on 
corporate shelves." 113 According to th e Intellec tual Property Owners Association, 
eliminating a fair market value deduction will "effectively end the opportunity 
for academic and scientific professionals at nonprofit research institutions and 
universities to develop valuable technologies acquired through patent donations 
from U.S. companies for which the tech nology is no longer a part oftheirstJ:ategic 
b usiness plans." 114 
The predicted decline in in-kind charitable giving of intellectual property, 
particularly patents, will most likely prove accurate when one considers tl1e 
dramatic impact that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 had on copyright do~a,tlohs by 
copyright creators. As discussed above, the 1969 Act eliminated the fair.market 
value approach for donations of copyrights by copyright Cfeators. 115 After the 
amendment, far fewer gifts were made by writers, artists, and photographers to 
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museums, libraries, universities, and other charitable organizations.116 Libraries 
and museums, in particular, reported significant reduc tions in an d, in some cases, 
complete losses ofgifts from n oted authors, composers, an d artists. 
The Museum of Modem Art in New York, for example, reportedly received 
321 gifts from artists in the three years prior to the 1969 amendment, but only 
twenty-eight gifts from artists in the three years following the amendment- a 
90 percent decrease.117 Another account shows that the M useum of Modem Art 
received forty-seven gifts from artists in the year 1969, but only one gift in the 
two years follow ing the 1969 amendment. liS T he Library of Congress, which 
annually rece ived fifteen to twenty large gifts of manuscripts from authors prior 
to 1969, received only on e gift in the four years after the 1969 amendment. 119 
More strikingly, whereas the Library ofCongress annually received a total of230 
self-created musical manuscrip ts and 179,000 self-created literary manusc ripts 
before 1969, it received none in the two years following the 1969 amendment. 120 
M any of the musicians and artists who planned to date their papers and artworks 
to the Library of Congress in stead sold them after the 1969 amen dmen t. J21 
Under the 2004 Act, for a charity to obtain ownership ofa patent and for a 
don or to receive any im mediate tax b enefit, the patent owner would have to sell 
the patent to a third party, pay a tax on resulting gain, and then contribute the after­
tax cash to th e ch aritable organization . T he charity, in turn, wou ld have to use the 
donated cash to attempt to purchase the patent from the third party purchaser. 
Most patent owners and charities woul d not engage in such man euvering; the 
related transactiona l costs and the risk that the charity may not be able to obtain 
the patent upon accep table terms and conditions would be too high in most cases. 
Moreover, as noted by one commentator, corporate inventors would not have an 
in centive to sell their patents an d contribute after-tax cash beca use corporations 
pay federal income tax at the same rate on long-term capital gains and ordinary 
income.122 Companies .only have an incentive to make an in-kind donation of a 
patent, rather than sell the patent and don ate the after-tax proceeds.123 
Although the new legislation has eliminated an immediate deduction for 
charitable patent contributions, it does permit donors to take future deductions if 
a donated patent generates income t o the ch aritable donee. 124 The government 
presumably believes that a charitable contribution system , solely providing donors 
with u ncertain, declining, fu ture economic incentives will adequately encourage 
patent donations. But th is premise is flawed. Even if a ch aritable donee licenses 
a donated patent, the potential futu re deduction s will not be substantial. 
First, it may take a charity several years before it receives any financial return 
on "a donated patent. As the patent begins to generate increasing royal ty revenues, 
however, the amount of the charitable deduction under the 2004 Act declines 
by use of a sliding-scale percentage (the percentage decreases each year for a 
lim ited time period). Indeed, j n the tenth postcontribution year, the donor may 
deduct only 20 percent of the income generated by the patent. As noted by one 
commentator, "T hat's really not any great incentive for a corporation to spend its 
time digging through its patents." 125 
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The 2004 Act is inconsistent with the government's historical approach of 
encouraging e.conomic an d socially desirable behavior through immediate tax 
benefits. As the government is well aware, what incentivizes behavior is a system of 
immediate economic benefits, rather than a system ofspeculative future benefits 
under an accrual approach. Indeed, tax law is replete with instances in which 
taxpayers are given immediate tax breaks to encourage desirable behavior. 126 
For example, to encourage innovation, Code section 174 permits a taxpayer 
to immediately deduct research or experimental expenditures when they are in­
curred, rather than deduct such costs over the useful life or legally protected life. 
of the resulting patent. 127 Providing an immediate tax deduction for desirable 
research and development is clearly inconsistent with the government's goal of 
matching income and the expenses that produced the income. 128 Nevertheless, 
immediate economic incentives are seen as necessary means to achieve a com~ 
peting, higher policy e nd: to encourage the d evelopment of new technologies to; 
drive economic growth. 
To further illustrate, many costs incurred in the development of computet 
software do not satisfy the definition of research and experimental expenditures 
un der section 174 and would seemingly be nondeductible. 129 Nevertheless, ~Q 
encourage computer software development, the government permits softw<:~.r~ 
developers to immediately deduct the costs of developing computer softwa:te-, 
whether the software is patented or copyrighted.130 In teres.tingly, the governme~t 
has chosen to adopt a broad definition of "computer software" to encourag~ 
software development activities.m , 
With respect to these examples (patent and software development), the gov.-. 
ernment recogn izes that financial incentives, provided to taxpayers with certainty 
and immediacy, are more effective than financial incentives provided on an uri"' 
certain, delayed basis. Therefore, to achieve optimal inventive and development 
activities, the government has adopted a system of immediate economic inceti.: 
tives. Ironically, with the 2004 Act, the government has taken an inconsistel;it 
approach in ach ieving the dissemination of innovation for social good . 
Although the 2004 Act eliminated any immediate economic incentive £9~ 
inventors to donate their patents by providing donors with only uncertain ful:)lte 
benefits in return for their donations, it has kept in place an immediate econoro:h:: 
incentive for outright cash gifts and most real estate gifts. Such retention .i~, 
perhaps, a result of the failure to acknowledge the significant shift in the level Q~ 
importance from tangible, physical property to intangible property. It is a genex~l 
reflection of the "legal and business uncertainty" associated with intanglbl¢5; 
as noted by Alan Greenspan, former C hairman of the Federal Reserve Boa~d. 
According to Greenspan: 
[T]his uncertainty derives from the fact that intellectual property is importantly 
different from physical property. Because they have a material existence, physical 
assets are more capable of being defended by police, the militia, or private 
mercenaries. By contrast, intellectual property can be stolen by an act as simple 
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as broadcasting an idea without the permission of the originator. Moreover, one 
· individual's use ofan idea does not make that idea unavailable to others for their 
own simultaneous use.132 
As intangible property has gained importance in the modern economy and 
society, new legislation must respond accordingly. 
Disadvantages of a System Based Solely on Future Economic Incentives 
The current ch aritable deduction regime for patents, based solely on specu­
lative, future economic incentives, raises several pol icy concerns. Although the 
new law has attempted to achieve horizontal equity by treating patent and copy­
right donors alike, 133 it also favors income-generating patents over patents that do 
not produce income. The new law essential ly separates patent donation s into two 
groups: money-making and non-money-making. The inherent implication from 
such a dichotomy is that patents used for fundamental or purely sc ien ti fic re­
search are not as valu able as patents that are used in applied research .134 Applied 
research often leads to commercialization, whereas the ma in motivation for fun­
damen tal or pure research is for the advancement ofkn owledge.135 Favoring one 
type of patent over another based solely on its capability for generating money 
shows that the government fails to comprehend th at both types of intellectual 
property are imp ortant. 
[M]ost scientists believe that a basic, fundamental understanding 6fall branches 
of science is needed in order for progress to take place. In other words, basic 
research lays the foundation for the applied science that follows. Ifbasic work is 
done first, then applied spin-offs often eventually result from this research.136 
Moreover, the new law favors commercially driven donees over otherdonees. 
The commercially driven donees are those that can use the patent in ways that 
will d irectly genera te income.l11e troublesome implication from such favoritism 
is that donees that emphasize education and basic research are n ot as worthy as 
the commercially driven donees because their utilization of donated patents 
will not directly generate income. This favoritism also rewards donees that are 
endowed with the physical fac ilities, financ ial resou rces, and personnel capability 
to exploit patents solely for direct fina ncial resul ts. 137 In other words, the n ew law 
favors the "have-donees" over the "have-not donees." This may serve to create and 
perpetuate the imbalance between the two groups of donees for patent don ations. 
U ltimately, the new law places the b urden on donors to search for donees 
capable of utilizing patents for the direct production of in come. Donors m ust 
conduct their own research and due diligence to determine, with a very high 
degree of certainty, wh ether a particular donee will use the patent donation 
directly to yield monetary resul ts. The new law assu mes that all patent donations 
have inh erent earning potential that can be translated into immediate income 
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for the donees. However, this assumption is false because many donated patents 
are orphan and have very little immediate commercial value. 138 If these paten ts 
are commercially valuable, the donors would keep and u se the patents for their 
own benefit. 139 After all, the creators and owners of these patents are often more 
capable of exploiting the patents than the potential donees are. 140 Furthermore, 
donors could have sold a valuable patent and given the money or part of it to 
donees, rather than make an in-kind charitable donation. 
It is bad policy to create tax law that fuvors money-generating patent dona­
tions over non-money-generating patent donations, as both types of donations 
contribute to society as a whole. The increased burden placed on donors to find 
commercially driven donees is unwise, and many potential donors may ch oose 
to allow these patents to die out at the expiration of the legal protection term 
instead. Researchers, investigators, students, and society as a whole will suffer 
the loss because the tax system fail s to encourage the dissemination of orphan 
patents. 
In addition, th e new law's sole focus on fu ture economic benefits imposes 
heavy administrative burdens, including modified and expanded recordkeep ing 
requirements, on both patent donors and charitable donees. Because the new law 
allows a donor to take deductions over a period of years that will be detem1ined 
based on the income derived &om the donated patent, the donor and the donee 
organization must communicate with one another and the IRS for several years 
following a qualified contribution. 
The 2004 Act requires donors to inform charitable donees of their intent: 
to treat the contribution as a "qualified intellectual property contribution" and. · 
take additional charitable deductions in subsequent years based on the income 
accrued from donated patents. HI In tum, the 2004 Act requires charitable donees 
to provide donors with written substan tiations explai n ing the amount of income 
derived &om donated patents during the taxable year. 142 Furthermore, charitabl!! 
donees must file an annual information return reporting their qualified donee 
income and other specified information. 143 
By a11 owing future deductions based on incom e received or accrued by the 
charity &om a donated patent itself, rather than income stemming &om the 
activity in which the dona ted patent is used,144 the pew law places a difficult 
burden on ch arities to track specific paten t assets. Each donated patent may 
h ave a different legal protection period depending on when each was invented. 
Monitoring individual patent assets and the extent to which each is generating 
income is a monumental task. 
Moreover, considering the future tax deductions at stake under the new law, 
donors will incur substantial monitoring costs. Specifically, the new law will 
require donors to expand resources to monitor the donee's income-generating 
activities directly related to a specific donated patent or patents. The burden 
is on the donor to come to an agreement with the donee prior to donation to 
ensu re that the donee will cooperate and submit all documents relating to the 
commercialization of the donated patents or financial documents to assist the 
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donor in obtaini ng future deductions based on a specified percentage of the 
qualified donee income. Future costs associated with these monitoring activi ties 
may outweigh any future tax benefits, due to the sliding-scale nature ofthe fu ture 
deduction scheme and d iscourage donors from giving patents. 
PROPOSAL FOR AN ElEGIVE CHARITABLE OEDUGION REGIME 
Concern over patent valuation abuses is not adequate justification for a 
complete paradigm shift from a charitable deduction system that provides certain 
and im mediate economic incen tives to one that provides only uncertain future 
financial incentives. To prevent the foreseeable loss of dissemination of patents 
for the maximum social good, it is critical that the government repeal the 2004 Act 
and adopt a fair market value deduction for all intellectual property contributions. 
A fair market value approach would necessarily require the imposition of strict 
statutory and admin ishative safeguards to minimize the potential for valuation 
conflicts, but not d iscourage valuable patent donations. Most importantly, the 
government should formal ize and articulate a standard approach to determine 
the fair market value of patents for charitable deduction purposes. 
With respect to donations of artistic works, the government has created a 
system for obtain ing fair, ob jective valuations. For example, the IRS has set up 
an Art Advisory Panel.145 Composed of twenty-five persons, including nationally 
prominent art dealers, museum curators, and auction house experts, the panel 
reviews and evaluates the acceptability ofartappraisals for income tax purposes. 146 
The Art Advisory Panel conducts an automatic review of any work of art with a 
claimed value of $20,000 or more.147 The recommendation ofvalue by the panel 
thereby becomes the IRS's positions as to valuation.l48 
The IRS has also implemented a valuation safeguard procedure whereby a 
taxpayer can request a "Statement of Review" for a work of art that h as been 
appra ised at $50,000 or more.149 Although significant guidelines exist for valuing 
works ofart, few ~uidelines exist for valuing intellechtal property intangible assets 
such as patents.1 0 Thegovernment would necessarily have to formulate valuation 
gu ideli nes to back up the fair market value approach.15l Such guidelines could, 
for example, require appraisers ofdonated patents to take into consideration, and 
document, the existence of related inventions or "prior art" which can decrease 
a patent's value. While prior art is often overlooked by a patent examiner when 
granting a patent, it should not be overlooked by an appraiser when valuing a 
patent. 152 
To enforce proper valuations and to prevent fraudulent or collusive behavior, 
the government should require increased accountability on the part of cha ritable 
donees. Thegovernment's approac h, historically, has been to place accountability 
on individual and small corporate donors. Prior to the enachnentof the 2004 Act, 
ifan ind ividual or small corporate donor claimed a charitable deduction in excess 
of$5000, the donor was required to obtain a "qualified appraisal" for the property 
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contributed, 153 obtain and attach a fu lly completed "a ppraisal summary" to the 
tax return on which the deduction was first claimed (wh ich described the fair 
market value of the property on the date of contribution ), 154 and maintain the 
records prescribed by the regulations.155 Further, if the IRS identified a situation 
in which a taxpayer abused h is right to a charitable deduction, the taxpayer 
and appraiser could be sub ject to penal ties, 156 while the charity could escape 
government penalty. 
While it is true that a charitable donee m ust sign and date an appraisal 
summary, such an act merely acknowledges receipt of the donated property and 
does not indica te that the charity agrees with the amount claimed as a deduction 
by the donor.157 Legislative reform is needed to ensure that both the donor 
and charitable donee are responsible for accurate valuatio'n. 158 The govern ment 
provides tax-exempt status to charitable organizations. What the government 
giveth, the government can taketh away in cases of valuation abuses. 
As an alternative to a system that solely provides current incentives, a char­
itable dedu ction system could give donors a choice: allow them to elect to take 
a single fair marke t value deduction in the year of contribution or, instead, take 
futu re ded uctions based on income. Congress h as a h istory of enacting economic 
stimulus provisions that allow taxpayers to elect to enjoy early the amount of 
their otherwise allowed deductions to encou rage des ired behavior. For example, 
the government has developed an elaborate cost-recovery system, under wh ich 
taxpayers deduct th e cost of acquiring various assets over prescribed recovery 
periods through appl ica ble deprecia tion and amortiza tion allowances. 159 The 
goal beh in d permi tting taxpayers to take depreciation or amortization deductions: 
over time is to ach ieve a fair allocation of the costs of acquiring an asset to the 
period in which the taxpayer realizes income fro m the asset. 160 The government 
has been willi ng to give up this tax policy goal of clear reflection of income by 
creating accelerated methods ofcost recovery to incentivize taxpayer behavior for 
maximum social good. 
For example, to encourage acqu isitions of certain tangible p roperty for cerj 
tain utilizations that would stimulate the economy, the government has au tho-' 
rized more rapid cost recovery by permitting taxpayers to elect larger deduction 
allowances in early years and smaller dedu ction allowances in the later years ofan 
asset's statutory recovery period.161 To provide even greater, immediate finan ciaL 
incentives to taxpayers who engage in certa in acquisitive transactions, the govern­
me nt has enacted provisions allowing taxpayers to elect to immedia tely expens.e 
100 percent of the acquisition costs, rather th an to capita lize and deduct those · 
costs over time. 162 Consistent with its h istorical approach of incentivizing desired 
behavior, the government could allow patent donors to elect to take an immediate 
tax d eduction for their donations in lieu of taking fu ture tax deductions based on 
income generated by the donated patent. 163 
By providing an election, the proposal implicitly recogn izes that patent 
donors, especially the n ew breed of donors today, are sophisticated and results­
oriented . Today's donors want max imum social impact in retu rn for what they 
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don ate.164 The donors want to be in control of their decisions and have choices, 
su ch as to elect to take a large deduction in the year of contribution or take future, 
postcontribution deductions based on incom e i n subsequent years . The donor is 
the party with the intim ate knowledge about the value ofthe patent th at it wants to 
donate. The p roposed election regime would allow the donor to decide whether 
to incur the risks and monitoring costs associated with the future ded uctio n option 
based on the value of the patent to the donee or to incur the appraisal costs and 
overvaluation risks associated with the certain current deduc tion option. While 
the election regim e would provide an option to donors tha t give applied resea rc h 
to comm ercially-d riven donees, it would create a necessary economic incentive 
to do no rs that give basic, purely scientific research to noncommercially driven 
donees. 
CONCLUSIO N 
T he in te rsection between intellectual property and taxatio n meets at the act 
ofgivin_g by the firm. Patent donation s must be encouraged for the benefit of the 
firm as the dono r, the chari table organizatio n as the donee, and soc iety as the 
ul ti ma te ben efactor. As econom ists have advocated, the best way to encourage 
giving is not by relying solely on moral or social incentives, but by providing 
strong economic incentives as we'1J.165 · 
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barriers, and to open and keep open services markets. They set procedu res for 
settling disputes. TI1ey prescribe special treatment for developing countries. 
They require governments to make their trade policies transparent by notifying 
the wro about laws in force and measures adopted, and through regular reports 
by the secretariat on countries' trade policies. 
31. With thefast growth and importance of the Internet and e-commerce, the WfO 
continues to play a central role in shaping the direction of governance of the new medium 
of global commerce. See generally Sacha Wunsch-Yincent, WfO, E-commerce, and 
Information Technologies (2004) (discussing role ofWfO in IT governance), available 
at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/wunsch1004.pdf. 
32. In addition to having a legal protection system for intellectual property rights, 
the federal government implements a strong enforcement system at both the national and 
international levels. See generally Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, 
State, the Judiciary, and Relat~d Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 107th 
Cong. (2002) (statement of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Sec'y for Econ. & Bus. Affairs) 
(describing U.S. Department of State's role in enforcement of U.S. intellectual property 
rights through foreign policy), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2002/9645. 
htm. 
33. There are three different patent categories: utility, plant, and design. Margo A. 
Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 469, 484 n.S4 (2003). A utility or plant patent is valid for twenty years 
from the date of filing. 3 5 U.S. C. § 154 (2004). A design patent is effective for fourteen 
years from the date of grant. 35 U.S.C . § 173. 
34. 35 U.S.C. § l54(a)(l). 
35. Under patent law, the applican t, patentee, or his assignee may grant and .convey 
"an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified 
part of the United States." 35 U.S.C . § 261. If the assignment, grant, or conveyance is 
not recorded with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its 
issuance, it will be void as against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration. 
I d. 
36. See David McGowan, Legal Implications ofOpen-Source Software, 2001 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 241, 263- 265; D. Gordon Smith, The CriticalTheoryofFiduciary Duty, 55 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1399, 1444-1447 (2002); see also Dan Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 
71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 3-8 (2004); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics ofRights 
in Valuable Information, 9 J. Legal Stud. 683,709 (1980); Edmund W. Kitch, T he Nature 
and Function oftlw Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265, 276 (1977). 
37. 35 U.S.C. § 261 {"Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall 
be assignable in law by an instrument in writing."). Initial ownership of a patent is with the 
inventor, but the ownership can be transferred. See, e.g., Jerry C. Liu, Overview ofPatent 
Ownership Considerations in Joint Technology Development, 2005 Syrac use Sci. & Tech. 
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L. Rep. 1; William Lynch Schaller, Growing Pains: Intellectual Property Considerations for 
Illinois Small Businesses Seeking to Expand, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 845, 912 (2004) (stating 
that only individuals can qualify as inventors for purposes of applying for patent, thus, 
in order for company to own and apply for patent; "ownership of the invention must be 
transferred to the company by written assignment from an individual"). 
38. The assignee enjoys the patent grant, which confers the right to exclude others 
from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented invention. Further­
more, as the assignee of inventions, a university is entitled to prosecute tl1e applications 
and to make ·amendments during prosecution. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 
321 F.3d 1111, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's finding iliat university 
assignee may correctly prosecute and amend applications during prosecution of patetl.t. 
applications). 
39. Universities usually have their own patent policies. For example, a university may 
embrace a policy that it owns all patents and inventions created by its employees during 
their time of employmenl See, e.g., Univ. of W. Va. Bd. ofTrs. v. Van Voorhies, 34.2 
F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing whether university's patent policy reaches 
second-generation patents). 
40. If the patent covers a research tool or method, the desire to have ownership 
is even greater because universities cannot rely on ilie e~11erimental exception in J}i¢1~ 
use of the patented tool or method to further their own investigation. See Elizabeth 
Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities DeseN.e. 
Special Treatment?, 57 Hastings L.J. 921 (2006) (arguing that universities shoo~d ·l?,e. ·. 
liable for patent infringement if they use patented research tool or method in ·theh: 
investigation without pem1ission in hopes that experimental exception works in th¢1t 
favor). 
41. See generally Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 FJd 1567, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) ("(L]icenses are considered as nothing more than a promise by th~ 
licensor not to sue the licensee."); id. ("[Under a license agreement], title to the patent 
does not change hands.... However, assignments pass title to the patentee's rights, witlt 
all the accomp~nying rights of ownership, from the patentee to the assignee.''), t)nJ:lk~ 
assignments, patent licenses are not recorded in the PatentOffice Assignment branc)l, Se~ 
Laurence H. Pretty, Issues of Ownership of Intellectual Property Assets Arisiryg in a Peal. 
Context, 751 PLI/PAT 9, 19 (2003) (stating tl1at Patent Office "assignment record .d®, 
not record patent licenses"). 
42. See generally Medlmmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, l3'79 (Ft::.il: 
Cir. 2005) ("[O]nce the license agreement was in place and [licensee] was in coml¥a!i.¢e 
with the terms of the agreement, [licensee] could not be under reasonable app~ehen:s.iqt1 
that it would face infringement suit by [licensorn . 
43. See generally Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed . Cir. 'ZOMJ 
{affirming patent infringement finding where licensee breached license agreement tha·t 
included several restrictions, including prohibition of replanting second generatl:oi:i: of 
seeds). . 
44. See, e.g., Mary J. Hildebrand, Software Licensing, 786 PLI/PAT 51-3; Slt..-'$3!, 
(2004) (setting forth issues for consideration in software licensing); Mary M.. Sq!.irte~~ 
Global Licensing: A License to Use, 824 PLI/PAT 363, 367-400 (2005) (indicating:i.ar'ioi.l~; 
terms and restrictions included in license to use). . 
45. See Ethan Horwitz, Patent and High Technology Ucensing, 831 PLVFA'l..:: w~ 
67-68 (2005) (discussing "field of use" restriction). 
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46. Id. at 68-69 (discussing license term). 
47. Id. at 67-68 (discussing territory restriction in patent and technology license 
agreements). 
48. Id. at 69 (providing reservation of rights by licensor). 
49. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 FJd 1351, 1352- 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(demonstrating Hcense use problem). Madey was a prominent researcher in the Depart­
ment of Physics at Duke Uruversity and held several patents relating to th e performance of 
free electron laser ("FEL") technology. Id. at 1352. After Madey was relieved from his post 
at Duke, some members of the university and research collaborators used the FEL equip­
ment that remained at the u niversity after Madey's departu re. ld. Subsequently, Madey 
sued Duke for patent infringement. Id. The Federal Circuit rejected Duke's argument 
that its nonprofit and educational status was adequate proof of the experimental exception 
to infringement. Id. The court held that the infringing use was to further the university's 
legitimate business objectives of: (1) educating and enlighterung faculty, researchers, and 
students; (2) enhancing Duke's status; and (3) attracting additional research grants and 
talented faculty and students. Id. at 1362. 
50. Litigation costs include not only breach of license agreement claims, but also 
patent infringement claims. See John Flock, Patent Licensing: Outlines, 825 PLIIPAT 
227, 235 (2005) (stating that when licensee uses patent beyond scope of license grant, 
licensee faces both breach of contract and patent infringement clairns). Likewise, in cases 
relating to a licensee's use of a copyright beyond the scope ofthe license grant, both claims 
of breach of con tract and copyright infringement are present. In a recent case where the 
lice nsee breached the license agreement and infringed the copyrights, the jury awarded 
the plaintiff$19 million in damages. See Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. 
Supp. 2d 737, 741- 744 (D. Md. 2003). 
51. Generally, universities with technology transfer offices focus on th e outgoing 
technology licenses, where the uruversities license their innovations to the commercia] sec­
tors in exchange for royalty income. See, e.g., UniversityTech nologyTransfer-Questions 
and Answers, www.ucop.edu/ott/tech.htrnl (explaini ng university technology transfers and 
licensing programs) (last visited Apr. 18, 2006); see also Gina C. Freschi, Navigating 
the Research Exemption's Safe Harbor: Suprome Court to Clarify Scope- Implications for 
Stem Cell Research in California, 21 Santa Clara Com puter & High Tech. L.J. 855, 888 
(2005) ("[Technology ) transfer is the fo rmal transferring ofnew discoveries and innovation 
resulting &om scientific research conducted at universities to the commercial sector."); 
Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing Global 
Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 Berke­
ley Tech. L.J. J031, 1041 (2005) ("[Through) technology transfer licenses[,] universities 
negotiate with drug companies engaged in commercializing the uruversities' academic 
discoveries''). 
52. See University Technology Transfer, supra note 51. 
53. Indeed, since un iversity technology transfer offices mainly address issues relating 
to the outgoing of technology, such as disclosure, publication, and license agreements 
with the private sector, tl1ey do not have enough staff to focus solely on obtaining licenses 
on behalf of their researchers. 
54. SeegenerallyOrtho Phann. Corp. v. Geneticslnst.,lnc., 52 F.3d 1026,1030-1035 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining and contrasting rights of patent owner and licensee). 
55. Intellectual property portfolios have become valuable assets and important tools 
to attract investment and venture capital. See gene rally Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives 
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ofMickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property LAw, 9 Va. J.L. . & 
Tech. 4, 28-29 (2004) (discussing origin of property rights in information goods in face of 
new digital markets for content). 
56. Commentators have noted that in the world of charity giving, "donors prefe~ 
to avail themselves of the charitable contribution deduction." Nina J. Crimm, Through 
a Post-September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles of Federal Tax Laws and Tax 
Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private Foundations and Their Donors, 2.3 
Va. Tax Rev. 1, 17 (2003). Thus, the incentive system centers on the availability of tax 
deductions. Id. at 22 (noting that numerous studies suggest that federal tax laws impact 
philanthropy); see also Charles T. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving 
288 (1985); Gerald E. Auten, James M. Cilke & William C. Randolph, The Effects .d/ 
Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions, 45 Nat') Tax J. 267, 267 (Sept. 1992); Charle~ 
A. Clotfelter, Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, in Philanthropic Giving: Studie~ 
in Varieties and Goals 105, 124 (Richard Magat ed., 1989); Joseph Cordes, The Cost of 
Giving: How Do Changes in Tax Deductions Affect Charitable Contributions?, Emerging 
Issues in Philanthro py: Seminar Series (The Urban Inst., D.C.), 2001, at 1- 3, available 
at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/philanthropy..2.pdf; William C. Randolph, Dy" 
namic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing ofCharitabl£ Contributions, 103 J. PoL 
Econ. 709, 735 (1995). 
57. I.R.C. §l70(f)(2)-(3) (2006). There are exceptions, however, if the partial interest 
is a charitable remainder interest in a trust. More specifically, a deduction is allowed :for 
a contribution of.a remainder interest in trust if the trust is: ( l ) a charitable remainde.r 
annuity trust, (2) a charitable remainder unitrust, or (3) a pooled income fund . ·rq, .§.§ 
170(f)(2)(A), 664(d)(l)-(2). For nontrust transfers, a deduction is allowed for a remaiqd~~ 
interest in personal residences or farms. Id. 
It should be noted that in Notice 2004-7, the IRS stated that it "intends to disallo)lii 
improper charitable deductions claimed by taxpayers in connection with the transf~r nf 
patents or other intellectual property to charitable organizations." IR.S. Notice -20.0.4,..; 
7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310. Notice 2004-7 set forth four situations arising out of intellectVai: 
property transfers to charitable organizations that will be closely scrutinized, including't}l~· 
transfer of a nondeductible partial interest in intellectual property. Id. 
Although donations of partial interests do not qualify for the income tax charil<!bl¢. 
deduction, donations of"undivided interests" do qualify. I.R.C. § l 70(f)(3)(B)(i i), 
58. See Rev. Rul. 2003-28, 2003-1 C.B. 594 (citing Treas. Reg.§ l.l23~Z.(IY)(~)), 
The "all substantial rights" testis primarily used to help determine whethe r a patenttl':'!iis(~r 
constitutes a sale (capital gains treabnent) or a license (ordinary income treatmen:f). 'rh~ 
test, however, is also useful in analyzing the tax treatment of a charitable donation. 
59. ld. (citingTreas. Reg.§ l.l70A-l(e)). 
60. Id. The regulations provide an example of a condition that is considered o:e@i~ : 
gible so as to qualify for a tax deduction. Id. ("A transfers land to a city government (or,;i~ · 
long as the land is used by the city for a public park. If, on the date of the gift, the city·doe.S: . 
plan to use the land for a park, and the possibility that the city will not use the l~d fo~·~ · 
publ ic park is so remote as to be negligible, A is entitled to a deduction under sectlon.IY-0 
for his charitable contribution. "). . 
61. See Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,429 (19.8.3):(ruliqi : 
that limited monopoly in copyright or patent "is intended to motivate the crea~ive a<;u~!fy~ 
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the pu;l:>.lld· 
469 Patent Donations a nd Tax Policy 
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired"); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind 
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individua l effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and Useful Arts."'). 
62. See Bcmito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) 
("The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation 
and avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance 
in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."'); Sears, Roebuck 6 Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 
U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("Patents are not given as favors ... but are meant to encourage 
invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by 
the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention."); see also Peter A. Jaszi, 
Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally­
Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 595, 
599-600 (1996) (emphasizing " economic and cultural bargain between authors and users 
[are] ... at the heart of U.S. [copyright) law, as reflected in the Patent and Copyright 
Clause [of the Constitution], and a parade of Supreme Court precedents"). See generally 
J. H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated intellectual Property Rights: 
Reconciling Freedom ofContract with Public Good Uses ofInformation, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
875, 897 (1999) (discussing bargain between authors and legislators). 
63. The concept of "public domain" upon the expiration of the patent monopoly 
was first addressed in the Singer case. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 
196-197 (1896). 
64. Indeed, the patentee has no right to collect royalties after the patent enters the 
public domain upon the expiration date. See generally Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 
33 (1964) ("[T]he exaction of royalties for use of a machine after the patent has expired 
is an assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when .. . the patent has 
entered the public domain."). 
65. Underproperty-based theoriesof the firm, the proprietary rights in the intellectual 
property assets serve to coordinate and allocate intrafirm activities as well as interfirm 
functions in the market. See supra note 36 and acco mpanying text. That means the role 
of intellectual property is crucial to fi rms and they would not easily sever the ownership 
of the intellectual property. Hence, regulations enacted to motivate and encourage firms 
to sever such ownership must contemplate the value intellectual property assets provide 
to the firm's functions. 
66. Assignment of intellectuaJ property rights by the finn means that it will have 
no title, interest, or right in the intangible intellectual property, unless the firm reserves 
some of its rights by having an assignment and license-back arrangement. See Sheila J. 
McCartney, Licensing Alternatives to Limit Antitrust and Misuse Exposure, 7 J. Proprietary 
Rts. 10, 16 (1995) (discussing grant back practice). 
67. I.R.C. § 170 (2006); see Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74~407, § 102(o), 
49 Stat. 1014, 1016 (1935) (allowing charitable ta.x deduction for contributions by corpo­
rations); Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917) 
(allowing charitable tax deduction for contributions by individuals). 
68. Tile government lost an estimated $145 billion in federal revenues from 2001 
to 2005 as a result of the generaJ charitable tax deduction provision. John D. Colombo, 
The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contribution Deduction: Integrating 
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Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 657, 658 (2Q0l), 
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that total forgone tax revenues from the chaP 
i!·able deduction will be $228.5 billion between 2005 and 2009. See Andrew Chamberlain 
& Mark Sussman, Charities and Public Goods: The Case for Reforming the Federal lp~ 
come Tax Deduction for Charitable Gifts 2 (Tax Found. , Special Report No. 137, 2005), 
available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/119l.html. .. 
69. See Colombo, supra note 68, at 682 (explaining that timing of amendments to 
section 170 charitable deduction provision suggests that government was seeking "volun, 
tary transfers from private sector ... to fund needed social programs"); Mark P. Gergen, The 
Case fora Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1393, 1397 (1988) (explaim 
ing subsidy theory); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspectiv.e, 
50 Mo. L. Rev. 85, ll5- ll6 (1985). · 
70. See Joannie Chang, Jennifer I. Goldberg & Naomi J. Schrag, Cross-Border Cirar. 
itabk Giving, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 563, 566 (1997) (theorizing that charitable contribution~ . 
should not be taxed, as they "relieve governmental btudens"); Daniel Halperin, A Chaii< 
table Contribution ofAppreciated Property and the Realization ofBuilt-in Gains, 56 T;IX 
L. Rev. l, 7 (2002) (explaining that one advantage of charitable deduction is that it gives: 
donor-taxpayer direct control over donation, rather than forcing him to rely on Congress'l 
choice of donee). But see Chamberlain & Sussman, supra note 68, at 1 (questioniog 
which groups should qualify as "charitable organizations" for purposes of charitable ta~ . 
deduction). 
71. See Chang et al., supra note 70, at 567 (citing James J. McGovern, The Exempt"ion · 
Provisions ofSubclw.pter F, 29 Tax Law. 523, 526 (1976); Edward H. Rabin, Charitali(~ 
Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 912, 920-925 (1966)). 
72. I.R.C. § 170. 
73. Rev. Rul. 83- 104, 1983-2 C .B. 46. Accordingly, if a donor receives a quid pro quo 
for a transfer to a charity, there is no "contribution" and, hence, no charitable deductio.r), 
allowed. 
74. Treas. Reg.§ l.l70A-1(g) . The apparent rationale for disallowing a deduction 
for the rendition of services is the administrative difficulty attendant upon determining th·i\ 
fair market value of personal service donations. See, e.g., Holmes v. Comm'r, 57 T .C. 43.1J,: .. 
·435 n.3 (1971). As another justification, the value of such services rendered has not been . 
taken into account for tax purposes (e.g., included in income). Treas. Reg.§ l.61- 2(c). I~ 
should be noted that unreimbursed expenses incurred incidental to the rendition of Nth 
services may, however, constitute a deductible charitable contribution. Id. § 1.170A-l (g}; 
75. I.R.C. § 1 70(c)(2). Other classifications include : federal, state, or local goy~rth· 
mental entities; certain war veterans' organizations; domestic fraternal societies, orders, 
or associations operating unde r the lodge system; and nonprofit cemetery companies and 
corporations.ld. § 170(c)(l ), (c)(3)-{5). 
76. See Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 G.B. 126 (''The fair market value of an undivide.d .. 
interest in a patent, which is contributed by the owner of the patent to an organjz~" 
tion described in Section 170(c) ... constitutes an allowable deduction as a charitabl~·· 
contribution, to the extent provided in Section 170, in the taxable year in which the prC!P.? · 
erty what contributed."); see also H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 53 (1969), reprinted inH6!}' 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1699 (providing that taxpayer who contributed appreciated prope#'. 
to charity was allowed deduction for fair market value of property); Treas. Reg. § 1.170/).:?._. 
t(c) ("'fa charitable contribution is made in property other than money, the amount:q.£ 
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the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of tl1e contribution 
reduced as provided in section 170(e)( I ) ...."). 
77. See Ron Layton & Peter Block, IP Donations: A Policy Review 5(2004), available 
at http://www.iipi.org/reports/IP ..DonationsYolicy_Review.pdf. 
78. The primary patent donors are large corporations witll major research and devel­
opment departments, including Dow Chemical, Proctor and Gamble, Boeing, Caterpillar, 
and Eastman Chemical. Id. at 6. The primary patent donees are universities that have the 
remaining capacity to exploit patents. I d. 
79. Id. 
80. On October 22, 2004, President Bush signed into lawthe American Jobs Creation 
Actof2004. AmericanJobs CreationActof2004, Pub. L. No.l08-357, 118 Stat.l418. This 
Act is a hybrid ofvarious versions that had been introduced earlier. For earlier versions, see 
S. 1637, l08tl1 Cong. §49 5(b) (2004) (limiting initial charitable tax deduction to donor's 
tax basis in donated intellectual prope rty, but allowing don.or to receive from charity up 
to 50 percent of any royalties received by charity with respect to donated intellectual 
property); S. 2103, 108th Cong. § l(b) (2004) (limiting initial charitable tax deduction to 
donor's tax basis in donated intellectual property, but allowing fair market value deduction 
for "qualified contributions" to "qualified research organization" (e.g., technology gifts to 
charities that appl y their expertise to scientific and commercial development}}. 
81. H.R. Rep. No . 108- 548 (2004). The new legislation does not apply to self­
created copyrights, described in I.R.C. §§ l22l(a)(3), l23l(b)( l )(C) (2002), because, as 
noted below, the 1969 legislation previously eliminated the fair market value standard for 
self-created copyrights. See infra notes 99- 100 and accompanying text. Furtl1ermore, tlle 
new legislation also does not apply to off-tlle-shelf computer software described in I.R.C. 
§ 197(e)(3)(A)(i). 
82. I.R.C. § 170(e)(l)(B) (as amended by 2004 Act). The new provision applies 
to charitable contributions of intellectual property made after June 3, 2004. H.R Rep. 
108-548. 
83. For example, section 174 ofthe Code permits a taxpayer to immediately deduct 
research or experimental expenditures. l.R.C. § l74(a). Research or experimental expen­
ditures are broadly defined as "expenditures incurred in connection with the taxpayer's 
trade or business which represent research and development costs in the experimen­
tal or laboratory sense" and generally include "all costs incident to the development 
or improvement of a product." Treas. Reg. § 1.174-Z(a)(l) (emphasis added). Expen­
ditures are incurred in tl1e "experimental or laboratory" sense if they are incurred in 
"activities intended to discover information that would eliminate uncertainty concerning 
tlle development or improvement of a product" Id. The regulations under section 174 
specifically provide that the costs of obtaining a patent are research and experimental 
expenditures. Id. Such costs include not only expenses incurred in creating patentable 
technology, but also attorneys' fees in the prosecution ofpatent applications. Id. (emphasis 
added). 
84. I.R.C. § 170(m)(3). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. (emphasis added). Temporary regulations issued under section 170 do not 
elaborate on this definition of "qualified donee income." Section l 70(m)(lO)(D)(ii) sug­
gests, however, that income arising from the charity's use of the donated property in 
its exempt activities (as opposed to royalties from licensing the property) does not give 
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rise to qualified donee income. Id. § l70(m)( IO)(D)(ii). As noted by one commentator: 
"[A]pplying the definition of qualified donee income is likely to prove difficult in many 
circumstances." Kevin Shortill, New Rules for Charities Receiving Certain Contributions 
o{Intellectual Property, 2005 EOT 30- 14, July 27, 2005, at 4. 
87. IR.C. § 170(m)(9) (stating that additional deductions are not allowed for do­
nations to private foundations, other than private operating foundations or certain other 
foundations described in LR.C. § 170(b)(l)(E)). 
88. ld. § 170(m)( l), (7). 
89. The amended statute provides that the additional deductions are limited to twelve 
years after the contribution. Id. § 170(m)(IO)(C)- (D). 11us twelve-year limitation seem~ 
to be in conflict with another rule providing that additional deductions are limited to 
the legal life of the intellectual properly, or ten years after the date of the contribution, 
whichever occurs first. ld. § l70(m) (5)- (6). 
90. Id. § l70(m)(7). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. § l70(m)(2). 
94. Id. § l70(m)(6). 
95. Id. § 170(e)(l)(B)(iii), 170(m). 
96. See Jobs and Growth Tax ReliefReconciliationActof2003, S. 6457, 108th Corig. 
(2003) (noting "widespread abuse involving donations of patents and similar property;'); · 
S. Rep . No. 108-192, at 218 (2003) (noting concern that intellectual property donors "are 
taking advantage of the inherent difficulties in valuing such property and are preparing 
or obtaining erroneous valuations"}; see also I.R.S. Commissioner Testimony: Charitabl~ 
Giving Problems and Best Practices, IRS News Release, June 22, 2004, at 14-15, available. 
at http:/l/www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-08l.pdf ("A key issue in intellectual property d.D-' . 
nations, as in all other property donations, is whether the property has been appropriately 
valued. In the case of patent and other intellectual property donations in particular, we 
have concems about over valuations, whether consideration has been received in return; 
and whether oqly a partial interest of property is being transferred.''). 
97. See infra n.ote 99 and accompanying text. 
98. Treas. Reg.§ 1.1 70A-l(c)(2) (2005) . 
99. Tax ReforrnAct ofl969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487,555. Whethe~ 
a reduction in the amount of the contribution of appreciated property (from fair markef 
val ue to cost basis) occurred depended on the character ofgain that would be reco~i.ted. · 
on a hypothetical sale of the properly by the donor. If the gain on a hypothetical sale b.y· . 
the donor wou ld be characterized as long-term capital gain, th e amount ofthe deductio~ · 
was not reduced (e.g., the amount ofthe donor's contribution was equal to the property'S. . 
fair market value). If, however, the gain on a hypothetical sale would be ordinary incom.{ 
or short-term capital gain, the amount of the deduction was reduced by the amount of 
that lurking ordinary income or short-term capital gain. I.RC. § l 70(e)(l)(A). The 1969. 
amendment affected the deduction of copyright donations by copyright creators, becaus·~ 
copyrights produced by donors are excluded from the definition of "capitll asset" and, 'if 
sold, produce ordinary income. ld. §§ 122l(a)(3), 1231(b)(l)(C). · 
100. For example, "qualified creative expenses" incurred by certain authors and arli~~ 
in producing manuscripts and works of art are deductible. I.RC. §§ 162, Z63A(h). A. 
"qualified creative expense" is any expense paid or incurred by an individual in the tra:d·¢;. 
or business of being a "writer," "photographer," or "artist," which, except for the unifornl. 
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capitalization rules of section 263A, would be otherwise deductible for the taxable year. 
Id. § 263A(h)(2). 
101. This is because if the donor had sold the patent, the gain would be treated 
as long-term capital gain under either section 1235 (special characterization provision 
applicable to patents) or sections 122l/l23l (general characterization provisions}. See 
I.R.C. § l235(a) (providing long-term capital gain treatment for transfers ofall substantial 
rights to patents by statutorily defined "holder" of the patent). 
102. For patent donation activity prior to the 2004 Act, see supra notes 77- 79 and 
accompanying text. 
103. See supra notes 10-13, 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing increasing 
importance and val ue ofpatents) . 
104. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1981) (concluding that 
value of donated patent was $3500, although patent donor claimed charitable deduction 
in excess of$200,000). 
106. The Commissioner ofthe IRS stated in a news release: 
[I)t is important for taxpayers considering donations of patents or other intellec­
tual property to focus on the limitations of the deductions .... We're seeing an 
increasing number of deductions that don't pass the smell test. Donations that 
are overly inflated or made with strings attached are going to receive increased 
scrutiny. 
Treasury Issue Notice Regarding Improper Deductions for Charitable Contributions of 
Patents and oth£r Intellectual Property, IRS News Release, Dec. 22, 2003, at 1, available 
at http://www. irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,id= 118 864,00.html. 
107. I.R.S. Notice 2004- 7, 2004-3 I.R.B. 310. Notice 2004-7 sets forth the following 
four situations arising out of intellectual property transfers to charitable organizations 
that will be closely scrutinized: ( l) the transfer of a nondeductible partial interest in 
intellectual property, (2) the donor's expectation or receipt ofa benefit in exchange for the 
contribution, (3) inadequate substantiation of the contribution, and (4) overvaluation of 
the intellectual property being transferred. ld. In addition to its warning to taxpayers, the 
Notice also sends a warning to promoters and appraisers that certain behavior will no longer 
be tolerated. Id. It states that the IRS will review promotions and appraisals of intellectual 
property when it scrutinizes suspect donations. ld. If the IRS identifies a situatio n in 
which a taxpayer abused his right to a charitable deduction, the taxpayer, promoter, and 
appraiser may all be subject to penalties. Id.; see I.R.C. §6662 (penalty provision applicable 
to taxpayers); id. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701 (pena lty provisions applicable to appraisers and 
promoters). 
108. I.R.S. Notice 2004- 7, 2004- 3 I.R.B. 310. 
109. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text for a summary of the 2004 Act. 
110. An earlier version of the 2004 Act, which limited the initial deduction to the 
donor's tax basis, was expected to raise $385 million per year. See Brenda Sandburg, 
I.RS Tweaks Rules for Patent Donations, http://www.ljnoniine.com/publlin-patent/4_9/ 
news/141878-l.html (Jan. 1, 2004) (describingimpactofS . 1637). T he government savings 
are a bit mislead ing, however. If private charitable giving declines as a result of the 
2004 Act, the government will need to provide increased direct subsidies to charities in 
response. 
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111. Under the prior law, it seems that owners could donate their intellectual property 
"inventories" and enjoy incredible tax advantages by attempting to wipe out a substantial 
amount of income by donating a sufficiently large portion of their intellectual property 
holdings. Currently, however, the Code imposes various ceilings on the total amount that 
a donor may deduct in any given year. I.R.C. § 170(b). For example, donations made by 
individuals directly to public charities are deductible to the extent that such contributions 
do not exceed 50 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. lei § 170(b)( 1)(A), 
(b)(I)(F). Donations made in trust for public charities or for the use of private charities 
are generally subject to a general limitation of 30 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross 
income for the year. l d. § 170(b)( I )(B)(i). For ceilings on gifts of appreciated capita l gain 
property, see id. § 170(b)(l)(C)(i), (b)( I )(D)(i). Contributions in excess of any of these 
ceilings are permitted to be carried over to the five succeed ing years. Id. § 170(b)( l )(B), 
(b)(1)(C), (b)(l}(D)(ii), (d)( I ). 
112. The 2004 Act does not affect donations of copyrights by their creators, as those 
donations were targeting by the 19691egislation. As noted above, the 1969 Act reduced 
the amount of a charitable deduction for copyright donors from fair market va lue to tax 
basis in the donated copyright See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text The 2004 
Act achieves horizontal equity by treating copyright donors and patent donors the same. 
This Article argues, however, that the 2004 Act went in the wrong direction in achieving 
horizontal equity. 
113. See Layton & Bloch, supra note 77, at 6. 
114. American Jobs Creation Act of2004: Law, Explanation and Analysis 432 (CCH 
Inc. 2004) (quoting association's comments regarding earlier, similar version of bill). 
11 5. See Sttpra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
116. For the effect of the 1969 Act, see Douglas J. Bell, Changing I.R.C. § 
I70(E)(J)(A): For Art's Sake, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 536, 547 (1987); Wj]Jiam A. 
Dren nan, Charitable Donations of Intellectual Property: The Case for Retaining the Fair 
Market Value Deduction, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 1045, 1127 (2004) (providing chart showing 
decline in copyright donations by copyright creators); Pamela J. Lajeunesse, Tax Incentives 
for Support ofthe Arts: In Defense ofthe Charitable Deduction, 85 Dick. L. Rev. 663, 668 
n.27 (1981); Larry D. McBennett et al.,ArtUpdate: Tax Deductions for Self-Created Works 
ofArt, 30 Fed. B. News & J. 342, 342-343 (1983). 
117. S. 1889, 108th Cong. (2003) (imparting Senator Patric k Leahy's statements 
introd ucing Artist-Museum Partnership Act of 2003); see also ACF Newsource, Artists' 
Gift, www.acfnewsource.org/artlartists.gift.h!ml (last visited Apr. 10, 2006). 
118. See Lajeunesse, supra note 116, at 668 n.27. 
119. See S. 1889;seealsoACFNewsource,supra note 117;Association ofArt Museum 
Directors, Statement for the Record, http://www.aamd.orgladvocacy/artistsdeduction.php 
(June 14, 2001). 
120. See Lajeunesse, supra note 116, at 668 n.27. 
121. See McBennett et al., supra note 116, at 342-343 (discussing music composer 
Igor Stravinsky who sold papers to private foundation in Switzerland instead of donatin.g 
then,1 to Music Division of Library of Congress); see also S. 1889; ACF Newsource, ruprd 
note 117; Association ofArt Museum Directo rs, supra note 119. 
122. See Drennan, supra note 116, at 1082- 1083. 
123. ld. 
124. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. 
125. See Fred Stokeld, EO Provisions in Bush Budget Aimed at Stopping Abuses, 102 
Tax Notes 699, 700 (2004). 
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126. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 198 (2006) (providing special expendihtre of environmental re· 
mediation costs); id. § 174 (providing immediate deduction for researc h and experimental 
expend itures); id. § 179 (providing election to expense certain depreciable business assets); 
id. § 179A (providing deduction for clean-fuel vehicles and certain refueling property); id. 
§ 179B (providing deduction for capital costs incurred in complying with Environmental 
Protection Agency sulfur regulations); id. § 181 (providing special treatment for certain 
qualified film and television production expenses); id. § I 90 (providing special treatment 
for expenditures to remove architectural and transportation barriers to handicapped and 
elderly). 
127. See supra notes 2, 83. 
128. T he government has enacted various capitalization and cost recove ry rules to 
achieve a fair allocation of the costs ofcreating or acquiring an asset to the period in which 
the taxpayer realizes income from the asset. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A (requiring 
capitalization of certain creation and acquisition costs); id. §§ 167, 168, 197 (permitti ng 
depreciation or amortization ded uctions for cap italized costs); see also Comm'r v. Idaho 
Power Co., 418 U.S. I, 11-12 (1974) (explaining purpose ofcost recovery system). In addi­
tion, the government has provided several exceptions for certain c reation and acquisition 
expenditures. See, e.g.,I. R.C. § 174. 
129. Many costs incurred in computer software development are not experimental 
or investigative in a laboratory sense and fail to satisfy the uncertainty test u nder section 
174. For example, the costs of developing rou tine accounting, management information, 
billing, or payroll systems involve no uncertainty with respect to the software design or 
capability. Hence, these costs would not qualify as section 174 research and experimental 
expenditu res. See I. R.C. § 174. Likewise, costs to produce documentation for mai ntaining 
and describing computer software would not qualify. 
130. Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-52 I.R.S . 60 1. This revenue procedure updated the 
IRS's prior pronouncement on the deductibility of computer software costs, Rev. Proc. 
69-2 1, 1969- 2 C.B. 303, by integrating changes resulting from the 1993 enactmen t of 
sections 167(f) and 197 ofthe Internal Revenue Code. ld. 
131. This defi nition provides: "For the purpose of this reven ue procedure, 'computer 
software' is any program or routine (that is, any sequence of machine-readable code) that 
is designed to cause a computer to perform a desired function or set of functi ons, and 
the doc ume ntation required to describe and maintain that program or ro utine .. .. " Rev. 
Proc. 2000-50, 2000- 52 I.R.S. 601. Because the government defined "computer software" 
so broadly, Revenue Procedure 2000-50 applies not only to software development costs 
that would othetwise constitute "research and experimental expenditures" under section 
174, but, more importantly, also to software develop ment costs that do not satisfy the 
definition of "research and experimental expenditures" under section 174. See id. Thus, 
Revenue Procedure 2000- 50 may permit tl1e immediate deduction ofcomputer software 
development costs, even where section 174 does not apply. 
132. Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks Regarding 
lntellech.Jal Property Rights at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Eco­
nom ic Summit (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
speeches/2004/200402272/. 
133. Horizontal equity 'is the principle that persons in like circumstances should be 
taxed equally. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, The Logic ofTax: Federal Income T ax Theory 
and Policy 55, 88 (1989). 
134. "Basic (aka fundamental or pure) research is driven by a scientist's cu­
riosity or interest in a scientific question." Lawrence Berkeley Labs, What Is Basic 
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Research?, http://www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSl/Frames/research-basic-defined-f.htmJ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2006) [hereinafter What Is Basic Research?]. "Applied research is 
designed to solve practical problems of the modern world, rather than to aqcquire (sic] 
knowledge for knowledge's sake." Lawrence Berkeley Labs, What Is Applied Research?, 
http://www.lbl.gov/Education/ELSI/Frames/research-applied-defined-f.html (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2006). The dichotomy of basic versus applied research has been a subject of 
controversial debate. Questions relating to the purpose ofeach type of research, the lack 
of funding availability for basic research, and the growth of indushy funding to finance 
applied research are at the heart of the debate. See Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Basic K 
Applied Research, http://www.lbl.gov/Ed ucation/ELSI!research-main.html (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2006). 
135. On the other hand, basic research has "no obvious commercial value to the 
discoveries that result from basic research" because the main motivation is "to expand 
man's knowledge." What Is Basic Research?, supra note 134. 
136. Id. ("People cannot foresee the future well enough to predict what's going to de­
velop from basic research. If we only did applied research, we would still be making better 
spears."). Other commentators, such as C .H. Llewellyn Smith, former Director-General 
of CERN, have argued that "governments have a special responsibility to fund basic 
science while applied science can generally be left to industry." C.H. Llewellyn Smith, 
What's the Use of Basic Science?, http://public.web.cem.ch/public/Content/Chapters/ 
AboutCERN/WhatlsCERN/BasicScience/BasicScience2/BasicScience2-en.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2006). 
137. Moreover, universities that have the facilities and resou rces still devote rntich 
of their efforts to many valuable "innovations that fail to generate substantial incm:ne 
returns but nevertheless advance the greater public good and are therefore commensurate 
with university missions." BethLynn Maxwell, Patrick Turley, John Warren & Natalie J. 
Wright, Overview of Licensing Technology from Universities, 762 PUlPAT 507, 513~514 
(2004). 
138. Moreover, mostnonorphan patents owned by universities do not directly generate 
much income. Kapczynski et al., supra note 51, at 1088 (stating that university technology 
offices' management of patents "tend to remain money-losing endeavors"). Kapczynski, 
et al. further observes: 
The number of schools that make money from technology transfer is small, 
and those that profit tend to do so from a limited number of highly successful 
patents. Licensing revenues are typically equivalent to just 4% of a muve~ity.'s 
research funds, and this figure decreases significantly when the costs of patent 
and license management, as well as the inventors' share of royalty income, are 
subtracted. When patent royalties are compared to total university revenue, they 
appear quite small, constituting only 0.5 to 2% ofrevenues, even for the subset 
of w1iversities that are patent-productive. 
Id. 
139. See Burk, supra note 36, at 8 (explaining that firms, as holders of inte)h;ct!i:lil 
property assets, possess knowledge and capability to coordinate development and exploi~ 
proprietary rights). 
140. Id. 
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141. I.R.C. § l 70(m)(8)(B) (2006) (as amended by 2004 Act); H.R. Rep. No. I 08­
755, § 882 (2004), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.CA.N. 1341. In May 2005, the IRS 
released new guidelines concerning the notification requirements that donors must follow 
to claim additional deductions for contributions of qualified intellectual property. I.R.S. 
Notice 2005-41, 2005-23 I.R.B. I. Under Notice 2005-41, donors of qualified intellectual 
property must deliver to the charitable donee, at the time of donation, a written statement 
containing: ( I) the name, address, and taxpayer information of the donor; (2) a description 
of the qualified intellectual property in enough detail that it can be identified by the 
donee; (3) the date of the charitable contribution; and (4) a statement saying tl1at the 
donor intends to treat the contributi on as a quali fied intellectual properly contribution 
under section l 70(m) and section 60501. Id. The IRS has asked for public comment on 
Notice 2005-41. See Comment Request for Notice 2005-41 ,70 Fed. Reg. 32706 {June 3, 
2005). 
142. I.R.C. § 6050L(b). 
143. Id. ("[E]ach donee with respect to a quali.6ed intellectual property contribution 
shall make a return ... with respect to each specified taxable year of the donee showing 
(A) the name, add ress, and TIN of the d?nor, (B) a description of the quaJified intellectual 
properly contributed, (C) the date of the contribution, and (D) the amount of net income 
of the donee for the taxable year which is properly allocable to the qualified intellectual 
property"). In May 2005, the IRS published proposed regulations, simultaneously released 
as temporary regulations, which provide guidance for the filing of information returns 
by recipients of qualified intellech1al property contributions. See Information Returns by 
Donees Relating to Quali.6ed Intellectual Property Contributions, 70 Fed. Reg. 29 460, 
(May 23, 2005) (to be codified at 26 C .F.R. pt. 1) (proposed regulations); T.D. 9206, 70 
Fed. Reg. 29450--01 (May 23, 2005) (temporary regulations). The regulations, effective 
May 23, 2005, affect charitable donees receiving net income from qualified intell ectual 
property contributions made after June 3, 2004. Under the regulations, a charitable donee 
is required to file an information return any taxable year of the donee that includes any 
portion of the ten-year period beginning on the date of tlle contribution, but not for taxable 
years after the expiration of the legal life of the qualified intellectual property. Temp. T reas. 
Reg.§ 1.6050L-2T(a) (2005). The return must be filed on or before the last day of the first 
full month following the close of the donee's taxable year. ld. § l.6050L-2T(d)(2). See 
I.R.C. § 770l (a)(23) (defining "taxable yea r"). The information required to be provided 
on the return includes: (1) the name, address, taxa ble year, and identification number 
of the donee; (2) the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the donor; 
(3) a description of the qualified intellecb.1al property; (4) tlle date of the contribution; 
(5) the amount of net income of the donee for the taxable year that is properly allocable to 
the q ualified intellectual property; and (6) such other information as may be specified by 
the form or its instructions. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 1.60501.r-2T(b)(l )-(6). The donee must 
provide a copy of the information return to the donor of the property on or before the date 
the donee is required to file the retu rn with the IRS.Jd. § 1.60501.r-2T(c)( l ). 
TI1e IRS issued (and asked for public com ment on) new Form 8899, on which 
charitable donees will report qualified donee income. See Comment Request for Form 8899, 
70 Fed. Reg. 37006 (June 27, 2005). Th e donee must provide a copy of the information 
return to the donor. l.R.C. § 6050L(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882(c)(l) 
(2004). 
144. J.R.C. § 170(m)(3) (amended by 2004 Act). 
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145. Anne-Ma rie Rhodes, Big Picture, Fine Print: The Intersection ofArt and Tax, 26 
Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 179, 197 (2003) (describing the panel). 
146. The Art Advisory Panel conducts an automatic review of any work of art with 
a claimed value of $20,000 or more. Id. at 197. The Art Advisory Panel works in closed 
meetings so as to protect taxpayer privacy and ensure objectivity and reviews works in 
alphabetical order by artist so as to minimize recognition of a taxpayer's collection. Id. 
147. See id. 
148. The Panel recommendation is reviewed by the Appraisal Service Office and then 
sent to the IRS. In 2003, the Panel reviewed 637 works of a rt with an aggregate claimed 
valuation over $200 mill ion. The panel recommended ad justme nts on 5 l percent of the 
reviewed appraisals (total adjustments equaled $68 million). Art Advisory Panel of the 
Comm'r of the Internal Revenue, Annual Summary Report for 2003 (2003). 
149. Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C .B. 627. The statement can be requested after the 
donation but before the filing of the tax return reporting the transfer and must be submitted 
with a qualified app raisal and appropriate user fee. Id. 
150. SeeParkwoodCorp. v. Comm'r, 9T.C.M. (CCH) 748 (1950). For IRS guidelines 
on valuing intangibles, see Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289; Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-l 
C.B. 237 (providing methods of valuing intangibles of a business). 
151. See, e.g., Drennan, supra note 116, at 1093-1106 (reco mmending special con­
siderations when valuing patent, and describingpossible modifications to current val uation 
mles). 
152. See Patent Sting, New Scientist, Oct. 18, 2003, at 6. 
153. Treas. Reg.§ Ll70A-l3(c)(1), (c)(2)(i)(A) (1996). For the definition of" qualified 
appraisal," see Treas. Reg. § J.l70A- 13(c)(3). 
154. Id. § l.l70A-13(c)(l), (c)(2)(i)(B). For the definition of"appraisal summary," 
see id. § l.l 70A- l3(c)(4). 
155. Id. § 1.170A- l3(c)(2)(i)(C). 
156. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2006) (donor penalty provision); id. §§ 6694, 6700, 6701 
(appraise r penalty provisions). 
157. Treas. Reg.§ l.l70A-13(c)(4). 
I 58. Although charitable donees should have increased accountability, the govern.7 
ment should also continue to impose restraints on donors, but apply such restraints equ.i­
tably to all donors of intellectual property. As discussed above, the restraints historically 
imposed on donors (e.g., the requireme nt to .obtain qualified app raisal and attach an ap~ 
praisal summary) were imposed only on individuals and small corporations. Any res.trai ni:S. 
to minimize valuation conflicts should be imposed on corporate donors as well. 
159. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167 (authorizing cost recovery ded uctions, such as depreciation 
and amortization allowances, for certain types of property); id. § 168 (prescribing depre, 
ciation methods and applicable recovery periods for depreciable tangible property); id. ·~ 
197 (providing ratable, fifteen-year amortization method for "section 197 intangibles"). 
160. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, ll-12 (1974) (explaining 
purpose of cost recovery system). 
161. The default "applicable depreciation method" for most tangible property is the: . 
200 percent declining balance method (which permits more rapid cost recovery tha!li fot 
example, the straight-line method). I.R. C. § l68(b)(l). Section 168(k), enacted in ZQQ~f. 
allowed a pu rchaser of"qualified property" to take an additional cost recovery dedu.cliO:~ 
equal to 30 percent of the property's cost in the first year (commonly known as "addition~!' 
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first year depreciation"). Id. § l68(k)(l ). In 2003, section l68(k) was amended to allow a 
taxpayer to elect to increase the amount of the additional fi rst-year cost recovery deduction 
under section 168(k)(l) to 50 percent of the cost of" qualified property" (commonly known 
as "50% bonus depreciation"). Id. § l68(k)(4). As a result of these immediate financial 
incentives, a taxpayer who purchased qualified property, otherwise recoverable over long 
statutory recovery periods, could elect to immediately deduct 50 percent of the cost in 
the first year and deduct the unrecovered remaining 50 percent over time through the 
applicable depreciation method. 
162. Section 179 of the Code, for example, allows taxpayers to elect to deduct currently 
the cost of acquiring certain depreciable business assets (e.g., computers, equipment, and 
off-the-shelf software) ratl1er tl1an deduct those costs over statutorily prescribed recovery 
periods. Id. § l79(a). The maxin1llm allowable deduction for all qualifying property placed 
in. service is $100,000 (for taxable years beginning after 2002 and before 2010). Id. § 179(b) 
(as amended ). The $100,000 amount is reduced dollar-for-dollar (but not beJow zero) by 
the amount by which the cost of qualifying property placed in service d uring the tax year 
exceeds $4{)0,000 in the case oftaxable years beginning after 2002 and before 2010. Id. 
163. The examples provided above deal with tangible property acquisitions. Another 
example relates to research and development. Section 174 aJlows taxpayer to elect either 
(l) to deduct research and development costs in the year paid or incurred or (2) to defer 
and amortize ratably such costs over five years. I.R.C. § l74(a)-(b). 
164. See supra notes 13- 17 and accompanying text (describing new breed of donors). 
165. See generally Steven D. Levitt & Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue 
Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything 19- 23 (2005) (discussing tluee basic 
flavors of incentive-economic, social, and moral - and noting that "[ v ]ery often a single 
incentive scheme will include all tluee varieties"; also noting problems with substituting 
one incentive for another, which "can produce drastic and often unforeseen results"). 
